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The First Palestinian Intifada (1987 – 1993) began on December 9, 1987 with riots 
protesting the killing of a young Palestinian man by the Israeli Defense Forces. The riots quickly 
grew into a much larger grassroots uprising – Intifada – against Israeli occupation. In the 
following weeks and months, the Occupied Territories were engulfed in waves of protests, 
demonstrations, boycotts, and other acts of civil disobedience, which continued until 1993. 
Although Intifada protestors represented a cross-section of	  Palestinian society, encompassing 
both old and young, male and female, a single, particular masculine trope soon came to 
dominate–that of young male activists risking life and limb to throw stones at Israeli forces.  
This thesis is about the development of that symbolic imagery at the intersection of youth 
culture, factional politics, and gender in the Palestinian Occupied Territories during the first 
Intifada. It explores the nascent political rivalry between nationalist and Islamist leadership and 
how this determined that a culture of male youth activism and martyrdom came to dominate the 
uprising. These two developments, nationalist-Islamist rivalry and the rise of male youth 
activism, are intimately connected to one another, as the support of young male activists became 
crucial to the legitimacy of Palestinian political organizations. Conversely, the support of formal 
political groups empowered, shaped, and encouraged the activism of young people. Increasingly, 





particular the representation of young male protestors became an integral trope in official 
writings, public discourse, and policy presentation. This reification of male youth activism in 
turn contributed to a cult of martyrdom and increasing violence among young male activists, 
marginalizing female activism during the latter part of the Intifada and symbolically 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
On December 9, 1987 Israeli Defense Forces shot and killed a young Palestinian man in 
Gaza after he threw a Molotov cocktail at an Israeli army patrol. Within hours, rioting and 
demonstrations erupted throughout Gaza and the West Bank, which had been under Israeli 
occupation since Israel’s victory in the 1967 War. The rioting was the culmination of days of 
tension. Earlier that week, an Israeli businessman was stabbed to death in a shopping center in 
Gaza. Two days later, four residents of the Jabalya Palestinian refugee camp were run down and 
killed by an Israeli truck in a traffic accident. Immediately, rumors circulated within the 
Palestinian community that the Israelis had intentionally killed the four Jabalya residents as an 
act of revenge. These riots quickly grew into a much larger grassroots uprising – Intifada – 
against Israeli occupation. In the following weeks and months, the Occupied Territories were 
engulfed in waves of protests, demonstrations, boycotts, and other acts of civil disobedience, 
which continued until 1993.1 Palestinians regarded the Intifada as a rebellion against Israeli rule 
and against decades of state repression and military occupation in the Territories, which 
frequently included targeted assassinations, mass deportations, detentions, and house 
demolitions, land expropriations, and illegal Israeli Jewish settlement.  
Although surprised by the sudden outburst, Palestinian nationalist leadership soon sought 
to gain control over the uprising. Several Palestinian nationalist organizations: The Palestinian 
National Liberation Movement (Fatah), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Palestine Communist Party (PCP), 
formed a coalition group called the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), 






Through this, they published leaflets, called bayanat in Arabic, political posters, and other 
materials offering direction, instructions, and praise for protesters and activists.2 The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine, which had for a long time focused its activities on largely non-political 
charitable endeavors, also responded to the uprising. In January 1988, young cadres of the 
Muslim Brotherhood formed Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, the Islamic Resistance 
Movement, whose Arabic acronym, Hamas, means “zeal.” Like the secular nationalist UNLU 
leadership, Hamas also sought to direct the activism of the Intifada, especially after nationalist 
leadership began to engage with Israel in formal peace negotiations that included talk of 
territorial compromise.3 A political struggle developed between Palestinian secular nationalist 
leadership and newly invigorated Islamist forces for ideological hegemony and control over the 
Intifada and the Palestinian struggle more broadly.  
Although Intifada protestors represented a cross-section of Palestinian society, 
encompassing both old and young, male and female, a single, particular masculine trope soon 
came to dominate–that of young male activists risking life and limb to throw stones at Israeli 
forces. This paper is about the development of that symbolic imagery at the intersection of youth 
culture, factional politics, and gender in the Palestinian Occupied Territories during the first 
Intifada. It explores the political rivalry between nationalist and Islamist leadership and how this 
determined that a culture of male youth activism and martyrdom came to dominate the uprising. 
These two developments, nationalist-Islamist rivalry and the rise of male youth activism, are 
intimately connected to one another, as the support of young male activists became crucial to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Second Ed. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009), 691 – 694. 
 






legitimacy of Palestinian political organizations. Conversely, the support of formal political 
groups empowered, shaped, and encouraged the activism of young people. Increasingly, the 
nationalist-Islamist rivalry was articulated around youth and youth political activism. In 
particular the representation of young male protestors became an integral trope in official 
writings, public discourse, and policy presentation. This reification of male youth activism in 
turn contributed to a cult of martyrdom and increasing violence among young male activists, 
marginalizing female activism during the latter part of the Intifada and symbolically 
transforming the Intifada into a predominantly male endeavor. 
The first Intifada was an important turning point for Palestinian youth activism and the 
political landscape of Palestine. There have been several studies on the social and psychological 
impact of the First Intifada on young activists. In Growing Up Palestinian: Israeli Occupation 
and the Intifada Generation, Laetitia Bucaille followed three young Palestinians from the mid-
1980s to the mid-2000s who grew up in squalid refugee camps and participated in the first and 
second Intifadas. Through their life trajectories, she argues that for many young people in these 
conditions it was easier and more appealing to become militants and political activists than it was 
to find gainful and fulfilling employment and a peaceful family life. Her study also reveals the 
class, gender, generational, political, and religious fissures in Palestinian society. Empowering 
youth as political leaders created a cycle of violence, which transformed the First Intifada from a 
largely nonviolent grassroots civil protest into an internally divisive confrontation. 
In his study on popular memory of the Intifada, Occupied by Memory: The Intifada 
Generation and the Palestinian State of Emergency, John Collins relied on interviews with 
subjects in their late 20s and early 30s. He shows that the first Intifada was a political awakening 





initiative in their interactions with a variety of adults ranging from teachers to prison 
authorities.” Collins examines how young Palestinians were “invested with powerful political, 
social, and cultural meaning” through Intifada discourse, but while his research does discuss the 
lionization of youth political activities in nationalist and Islamist discourse, he does not stress the 
essential context of the political and ideological rivalry between these two political camps.4 
Several anthropological and ethnographic works have also shown the psychological and 
social impact of the First Intifada. In her essay “Divine Impatience: Ritual, Narrative, and 
Symbolization in the Practice of Martyrdom in Palestine,” Linda M. Pitcher suggests that young 
people responded to their discursive place at the heart of the uprising, defining and redefining not 
only what their role would be as politically active young people, but also what the Intifada would 
look like and come to represent. In particular, she argues that politically active youth were 
helping to forge new symbols of Palestinian resistance, which they would themselves embody—
“the martyr [shaheed], the political activist [shabab], and the political prisoner,” as well as “new 
principles of Palestinian ethnicity (steadfastness, perseverance, and sacrifice).”5 
Likewise, other studies have investigated questions of gender during the Intifada. For 
instance, Julie Peteet argues in “Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian 
Intifada: A Cultural Politics of Violence,” that participation in protests, and the consequences of 
protesting, such as arrest and beatings, became part of male gender performance for young 
Palestinians. The experience of violence became a rite of passage for many young male 
Palestinians, both in terms of enacting violence by throwing stones or Molotov cocktails, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 John Collins, Occupied by Memory: The Intifada Generation and the Palestinian State of 
Emergency (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 7 – 8. 
 
5 Linda M. Pitcher, “‘The Divine Impatience’: Ritual, Narrative, and Symbolization in the 
Practice of Martyrdom Palestine,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 12, No. 1, 





through the experience of violence performed against them, in the form of punishments and 
Israeli repression. Related violence had a transformative effect, galvanizing those who 
experienced it to transform and challenge certain social power structures, while at the same time 
reaffirming others. Peteet also addresses the formation of a culture of youth martyrdom in “Icons 
and Militants: Mothering in the Danger Zone.” Here, she asserts that during both the Lebanese 
Civil War and the First Intifada the “front” of these conflicts was the home itself, belying the 
notion of masculine and feminine spheres of wartime experience. Mothers were encouraged to 
rejoice at their children’s nationalist activities, view their deaths as a sacrifice to the national 
cause, and give comfort and support to young protestors and fighters who were not their own 
biological children, replicating the functions of motherhood for them.6   
The First Intifada was also a crucial turning point for Palestinian politics, as it gradually 
legitimized Palestinian nationalist leadership on the international scale through the Oslo peace 
process and precipitated Hamas as a powerful alternative political force. Several academic 
studies have addressed the emergence of the nationalist-Islamist rivalry during the Intifada. 
Jonathan Schanzer studies intra-communal political differences and violence among Palestinians 
and chronicles the struggle between Fatah and Hamas for political hegemony. He argues that 
Palestinian nationalist leaders and Hamas were struggling as much with each other as against 
Israeli policies. As Hamas gained strength on the ground in the Occupied Territories through acts 
of violence and civic engagement, Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, responded by seeking to claim 
superior international credentials, renouncing terrorism and formally accepting pre-1967 Israeli 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Julie Peteet, “Icons and Militants: Mothering in the Danger Zone,” Signs: Journal of Women in 





borders.7 Meir Litvak also explores the Nationalist-Hamas rivalry. Hamas argued that it was 
better able to lead and represent the Palestinian people because it was located within the 
Territories, while nationalist leadership was outside, exiled to Tunisia since the Lebanese Civil 
War.8 
Finally, Sara Roy’s work on the history of Hamas has also been important to 
understanding the relationship between nationalist and Islamist forces in Palestine. Roy discusses 
the rivalry between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its affiliated organizations 
and Hamas over government institutions, particularly in Gaza, arguing that as these groups 
struggled for control, the institutions of civil society were weakened because they were guided 
by partisan rather than objective aims. However, she asserts that Hamas grew in influence 
because it was able to project a public image as a counter-hegemonic authority to the secular 
nationalist leadership through its social service initiatives, particularly those related to youth. 
Elsewhere, Roy maintains that a large part of Hamas’ success as an organization is due to its 
civic engagement and charitable works. In addition to its more militant activities, Hamas also 
organizes important social service initiatives and programs, which emphasize community 
development and civic growth over violence. These social institutions advocated for stability and 
political and religious moderation, made services available for people from different social 
segments, and supported social and cultural renewal among Palestinians. Additionally, through 
these institutions, Hamas was able to prove its ability to govern effectively and honestly. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine, (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008), 23 – 30. 
 
8 Meir Litvak, “Inside Versus Outside: The Challenge of Local Leadership, 1967 – 1994,” 
Avraham Sela and Moshe Ma’oz, eds., The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political 





Intifada period enabled Hamas to consolidate its control over the Islamic social sector, which in 
turn prompted the formation of new social institutions in the Occupied Territories. 
To my knowledge no study has yet synthesized these elements to demonstrate the ways 
young male activists shaped, and were shaped by, the political contest between nationalist and 
Islamist leadership that began during the First Intifada, and the gender implications of these 
processes. Accessing the theories of Karl Mannheim and Ian Hacking, this paper seeks to fill that 
gap in knowledge to show that the rivalry and struggle for power between these political 
competitors was framed in large part around the activism of young men, transforming “shabab” 
(young people – in this context, those involved in the Intifada) into a uniquely masculine social 
category, which in turn masculinized the Intifada itself and reaffirmed longstanding conceptions 
of gender and resistance.  
The young Palestinians who took part in the riots and demonstrations of the first Intifada 
represent a unique generation, which shared the particular experience of mass revolt. According 
to Karl Mannheim in his essay “The Sociological Problem of Generations,” a generational unit is 
more than just a collection of individuals of the same age; it is a collection of people of similar 
age who experience an important historical event at a particular time and place, which he refers 
to as the “generational location.” Through these common experiences, an age cohort can develop 
a generational consciousness.9 Sociologists Bryan S. Turner and June Edmonds expand on this 
idea, asserting that this generational consciousness can lead to political engagement.10 The events 
of the First Intifada could be understood as a “generational location” for the young people who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
(London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1952), 181 – 182, 186 – 187. 
 
10 June Edmonds and Bryan S. Turner, “Global Generations: Social Change in the Twentieth 






participated in it, which in turn prompted greater political engagement and participation on the 
part of this unique generation. 
Furthermore, public discourse on the Intifada, and on the young people who participated 
in it, helped to forge this activist generation into a unique social group with specific traits. Ian 
Hacking’s theory of appellation, called The Looping Effect, is useful for understanding this 
process. According to Hacking, new social groups emerge in response to new social situations 
and events. As a new social group is identified and named in society, a discourse emerges about 
that group. Individuals, being aware of their placement in a certain social category, in turn react 
to the discourse about their category, thus exerting an influence on the discourse circulating 
about their group and kind. What is more, by influencing the discourse on their own group, 
group members have the ability to redefine what it means to be a member of that group.11 During 
the Intifada years, politically active shabab – young people – emerged as a new and separate 
social category, defined equally by heroism in the face of a much stronger Israeli military force, 
by a need for guidance from above and, above all, as male.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effect in Human Kinds,” in Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary 
Debate, David Premack and Anne Premack, Eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 






Chapter 2 - Gendering Nationalism and Resistance 
Modern nation states, and their citizens, have often been thought of in gendered terms. 
According to Benedict Anderson, the nation is commonly conceived of as a fraternity, a “deep 
horizontal comradeship” of brothers. If the citizens of a nation are a fraternity, then by extension 
the nation itself is often thought of as a symbolic mother figure, the source of this brotherhood of 
citizens, which citizens have a responsibility to protect. These ideas endow the nation state with 
symbolic and emotional weight and help make possible “over the past two centuries, for so many 
millions of people, not so much to kill, as to willingly die for such limited imaginings.”12 
Within the Middle Eastern context, much has been written about the gendered dynamics 
of nationalism and national identity. According to Beth Baron in her study of Egyptian 
nationalism, the nation state was thought of as symbolically female, not only as a mother figure 
but also as a young virgin lover in need of protection by her male guardians, its citizens. This 
gendered dynamic became an inherent part of nationalist iconography in 19th and early 20th 
century Egypt, as writers and artists produced work intended for a male audience of citizens that 
actively played on Arab notions of masculine honor and responsibility to control and protect 
female family members, in this case the nation state itself.  What developed from this discourse 
was an active-passive nationalist dynamic in which the male citizen was the actor, the doer of 
deeds, the speaker, and the lover, while the female nation was the object of these energies – “the 
acted upon, the listener, the beloved.”13  Although Baron’s study focuses exclusively on Egypt, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Revised Edition, (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 7. 
 
13 Beth Baron, “Nationalist Iconography: Egypt as a Woman,” in Rethinking Nationalism in the 
Arab Middle East, James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds. (New York: Columbia University 






other scholars, including Najmabadi in her work on nationalism in Iran, have demonstrated that 
these gendered nationalist ideas had currency throughout the region.14 
If protecting and defending the nation was thought of as a masculine endeavor, then the 
loss of a nation was an acutely emasculating experience. Following the 1948 war and the 
establishment of the state of Israel, roughly 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were ejected from their 
homes in historic Palestine and settled as refugees in the surrounding Arab states of Lebanon, 
Jordan, Syria, as well as in Egypt and Iraq. According to Rashid Khalidi, this loss of homeland 
and the displacement of so many Palestinian Arabs into neighboring territories meant a “loss of 
agency” for Palestinians in their own national struggle either to Israel or to the governments of 
the Arab states that housed them as refugees.15 This loss of agency is often expressed in 
Palestinian nationalist literature through language of sexual frustration and unrequited male love 
for a female object.  For instance, in the poem Blessed be that which Has not Come! by 
Mahmoud Darwish, Palestinian national aspirations are described as an unconsummated 
marriage, a disruption of normal gender dynamics, in which “Never shall lover reach lover / 
Except as martyr or fugitive.”16 Here, Palestine is imagined as a bride that the groom, the 
Palestinian people, may never possess except through death when they would be literally 
implanted into her by burial. The male subject of this poem, the Palestinian people, is thus 
denied his right to possess his bride, the Palestinian state, and must remain in a state of sexual 
and romantic frustration. Similar themes of frustration and yearning appear again in Darwish’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Afsaneh Najmabadi, “The Erotic Vatan (Homeland) as Beloved and Mother: To Love, to 
Possess, and To Protect,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 39 (No. 3 July 1997). 
 
15 Rashid Khalidi, Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, (Boston, MA, 
USA: Beacon Press, 2007), 135 – 136. 
 





1966 poem Lover from Palestine, in which the male speaker longs for his beloved, whom he 
names “Palestine,” but may never possess her.  
The writing of Ghassan Kanafani similarly takes up this theme of emasculation and the 
loss of the homeland. This idea is epitomized in his story “Men in the Sun” through the character 
Abul Khaizuran, who was chemically castrated following injuries in the 1948 war and who now 
seeks to profitably exploit Palestinians living in Iraq. Abul Khaizuran agrees to transport the 
three protagonists, Abu Qais, Assad, and Marwan, all Palestinian exiles, across the Iraq-Kuwait 
border in the water tank of his truck. The water tank becomes so hot during that day that it is 
only possible to remain inside for a few minutes without suffocating. When stopped at a 
checkpoint and forced to listen to an Iraqi guard’s ribald story of an affair with a prostitute, Abul 
Khaizuran relates a false story about his own masculine virility, which the reader knows is not 
true. The delay causes the three men in the truck to die. According to Amy Zalman, “the journey 
taken by the men in the sun is structured by a crisis related to prevailing notions of manliness in 
the same degree that it is by the sense of national crisis.”17 That is, the various disruptions of 
normal life experienced by these characters due to displacement and, in the case of Abul 
Khaizuran, physical impotence, act as an allegory for an emasculated and conquered nation. 
This sense of emasculation was not only due to the loss of the Palestinian homeland to 
Israel, but also to the subordination of the Palestinian cause to the needs and interests of 
neighboring Arab governments. The Palestinian loss of agency in their national struggle 
“manifested itself in the struggle over who would ‘represent’ the Palestinians.” Consequently, 
though the Palestinian question remained an important ideological symbol for Arab 
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governments, the Palestinian national cause was subordinated in the 1950s into the political 
interests of other rulers, who considered independent Palestinian political organization as a 
potential threat to their authority.18  
Despite such repression, Pan-Arab nationalism of the 1950s inspired a new generation of 
activists from the Palestinian diaspora to advance Palestinian nationalist aspirations. Pan-Arab 
nationalism understood Arabs as a united national identity and called for the unification of Arab 
states into a single political entity. This period also witnessed the continuing development of 
independent Palestinian political activism and the formation of “independent, clandestine 
campaigns of political organization and military training” among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip 
and elsewhere.19 
From its outset, Palestinian resistance was imagined as a primarily masculine endeavor 
and relied heavily upon gendered language and imagery. In 1959, a group of politically active 
Palestinian graduates of Cairo University living in Kuwait founded The Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement (Fatah).20 Fatah was secular nationalist in its outlook and eventually grew 
to become the largest, most popular, and most influential of the Palestinian nationalist 
organizations. Other guerilla groups were founded during this period with the goal of liberating 
Palestine from Israeli control through armed resistance, a development that “threatened Arab 
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regimes, which by then had reached a modus vivendi with the decade-old Israeli state.”21 
Responding to this development, The Arab League, which represented the governments of 
several Arab nations, founded The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 as an 
organization through which to channel Palestinian political action and pursue the cause of a 
Palestinian state.   
The PLO’s first two documents were the Palestinian Nationalist Charter and the 
Palestinian National Charter, which defined the goals and methods of the PLO and Palestinian 
resistance more broadly. The documents accessed gendered language to define what and who 
constituted the Palestinian nation and the nature of resistance to Israel. The Charter describes the 
Zionist takeover of Palestine “as a rape of the land” and “views Palestinians as the children of 
Palestine, portrayed as a mother” while “the Zionist enemy is clearly seen as masculine.”22 In 
this conception, the loss of the Palestinian state to Israel is described in sexually violent terms, as 
a violation that fundamentally changes the nature of the Palestinian people and shifts the 
responsibility of reproducing the nation from the mother-territory to male Palestinians 
themselves.  
Article 4 of the Palestinian National Charter defines “Palestinian identity as ‘a genuine, 
inherent and eternal trait and is transmitted from fathers to sons.”  Article 5 states that 
“Palestinians are those Arab citizens who used to reside ... in Palestine until 1947… and 
everyone who is born of an Arab Palestinian father after this date – whether inside Palestine or 
outside it – is a Palestinian.’” According to Joseph Massad, this shift in definition of what 
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constitutes Palestinian identity directly relates to this notion of the rape of the Palestinian 
motherland. Prior to 1947, Palestinian identity is determined in maternal terms by birth in the 
land of Palestine, but after 1948 and the metaphoric “rape” of Palestine, Palestinian identity is 
instead determined through “physiological and metaphorical paternity.” Thus, the responsibility 
for reproducing the Palestinian nation shifts from the mother – the despoiled territory – to 
Palestinian men, who endow their children with Palestinian identity. According to Massad, 
“within this metaphoric schema, women clearly cannot be agents of nationality. Their role, thus, 
becomes secondary and supportive in the narrative of nationalism.”23  
The centrality of male actors to the Palestinian national movement is further emphasized 
through the PLO focus on armed resistance as the central means of confronting Israel. The PLO 
charter defined “armed struggle” as “the only way to liberate Palestine” and that “commando 
action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war.”24 Indeed, during the 
1960s and 1970s, Palestinian resistance took on a largely “underground, secretive, populist, 
activist, and radical” character through the militant activities of the PLO’s composite 
organizations, including Fatah. Collectively, these militant groups were called Harakat Al-
Muqawama Al-Filastiniyya (the Palestinian Resistance Movement - PRM) and their guerilla 
fighters – called feda’iyyin in Arabic – coordinated attacks against Israel and Israeli interests.25  
However, this gendered conception of nationalism and resistance did not preclude active 
female participation in the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Throughout the late 1960s and 
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1970s, women were recruited into the PRM in fairly large numbers as full time or part-time 
members or as more loosely associated “friends” of the PRM, and given military and political 
training. Additionally, a few women, such as Leila Khaled, emerged not only as active 
participants in Palestinian resistance, but also as spokespeople and icons of the movement.  
Involvement in the PRM often provided women an avenue for greater personal choice and 
freedom, as Julie Peteet shows in her study of women in the PRM in Lebanon in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. According to Peteet, full-time involvement in the PRM, which paid members’ 
salaries and often also provided housing, enabled women to exercise a degree of choice in 
selecting husbands, family planning, divorce, and other issues that would traditionally be left 
either to the larger family structure or to the husband.26 However, according to Rosemary 
Sayigh, most of the female members in the PRM were assigned to “support activities that were 
'natural' extensions of their domestic skills–nursing, providing food and uniforms for the fighters, 
setting up the social and cultural institutions that accompanied armed struggle.”27 Female PRM 
members also had the challenge of balancing their duties with the resistance with their domestic 
responsibilities, for which they were typically solely responsible, even when their family 
members encouraged their involvement with the PRM.28 Indeed, during this period, women’s 
domestic tasks and family member support were configured as a service to the nation, with 
losing a son to the cause being the ultimate act of female resistance.29 
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If we understand the loss of the Palestinian nation as an acutely emasculating experience, 
then the conditions of life under Israeli Occupation following the 1967 War could be seen as the 
ultimate robbery of manhood. Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem came under Israeli 
control following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which Israel defeated the combined military 
forces of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. While Israel eventually annexed East Jerusalem, Israel ruled 
the West Bank and Gaza in a perpetual state of emergency, a police state, in which the Israeli 
military had the power to confiscate and destroy property, detain and arrest individuals without 
due process, and impose restrictions on people’s movement, among other powers. According a 
1989 report produced by Al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights non-governmental organization, 
Israel reinstated the British Defence (Emergency) Law, which had originally been imposed by 
British Mandate authorities in Palestine to quell unrest in 1945. These laws gave British forces 
wide authority to govern the Mandate as a police state, with the power to “deport citizens of 
Palestine, to demolish houses, to impose curfews and town arrest, to censor newspapers and 
books, and to administratively detain, all without the necessity of judicial proceedings.”30  
Beyond the legal implications of Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories, the broad 
powers of the Israeli occupying forces created an acute human rights crisis for those living in 
these areas. According to a 1987 report by al-Haq, Israeli house demolition policies, and similar 
punitive strategies, were extreme punishments, which punished not only those individuals 
accused of anti-Israeli political activities, but also their families. These measures constituted a 
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“collective punishment” with long lasting consequences for the well-being of Palestinian 
society.31 These issues were similarly explored in several United Nations reports from the 1980s 
and earlier. One UN report from 1985 asserted that Israeli forces had evicted and displaced two 
hundred Palestinian families, stating that “houses have been demolished; grain storage and water 
wells destroyed, and villagers have been forced off their lands,” actions that constitute “direct 
contravention of principles affecting basic human rights.”32  
The generation of young Palestinians growing up under these conditions thus shared the 
common experience of political repression, made worse in many cases by the poor living 
conditions in Palestinian refugee camps and by bleak economic prospects. Many of the people 
who lost their homes during the 1948 war, called the Nakbah (Catastrophe) by Palestinians, 
continued to live as refugees in camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and in the Occupied 
Territories. Many of the young people taking part in the Intifada were the children and 
grandchildren of these displaced people, who grew up as refugees. These camps, run by the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency, housed hundreds of thousands of people in cramped, 
and often inadequate living spaces. The camps also had underdeveloped infrastructure, many 
lacking basic amenities like running water and proper sanitation.33 Conversely, the Israeli state 
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dedicated millions of dollars to developing Jewish settlements in the Territories, providing these 
settlements with the infrastructure, sanitation, and security not available in the nearby Palestinian 
areas.34 
Additionally, economic prospects were poor in the Occupied Territories, with the 
economy of Palestine subordinated to the economic needs and interests of Israel. According to 
historian Benny Morris, Israeli economic policies in the Territories made Palestine a virtual 
“slave market,” dependent upon Israeli imports for food and finished goods.35 A UN report from 
1985 on living conditions in the Palestinian Occupied Territories likewise claimed that through 
land confiscation, the expropriation of natural resources, including water, and lack of investment 
in Palestinian Arab zones, the Israeli occupation had resulted in “overall stagnation of the 
Palestinian economy.”36 In these conditions, many young people were unable to find well-paying 
jobs despite high school and college diplomas, especially after Gulf nations placed limits on 
migrant worker programs earlier in the 1980s. Most Palestinian workers could hope only for 
menial labor, while many remained unemployed.37 
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The spontaneous mass mobilization of the Intifada, centered within the Occupied 
Territories, represented a shift in Palestinian activism away from the Palestinian Diaspora in 
neighboring Arab states. Following the 1967 War, feda’iyyin militants took control of the 
leadership of the PLO and the organization became a “revolutionary umbrella organization under 
the influence of Fateh and Fateh’s leader,” Yasser Arafat.38 The PLO established bases in 
neighboring countries; first in Jordan, from which it was violently expelled in 1970, and then in 
Lebanon where, by the early 1980s, they had succeeded in forming a virtual state within a state 
within the Palestinian refugee camps. Tensions mounted between Palestinian militants and the 
Lebanese Christian community, which eventually erupted into a civil war in 1976 that came to 
involve all religious and political factions in Lebanon as well as the governments of Syria and 
Israel. The fighting concluded in 1982, after Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and forced the PLO 
to leave Lebanon for Tunisia.  
The PLO exile to Tunisia contributed to a widespread reappraisal of the tactics and 
methods of Palestinian resistance. By the late 1980s and the start of the Intifada, PLO leadership 
had been operating from Tunisia for several years, away from the bulk of its constituents living 
in the Occupied Territories and in neighboring Arab states. The removal of the PLO prompted 
questions about how and from where liberation might come. In particular, the PLO exile 
contributed to the decline of the prevailing belief that “salvation would come from the outside;” 
that is, from the Palestinian Diaspora.  Thus, in the years before the Intifada, “the focal point of 
the conflict had moved to the occupied territories” and away from Palestinian zones in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






neighboring Arab states.39 However, as Rashid Khalidi notes, despite the physical distance 
between the PLO and the bulk of its Palestinian constituents, the PLO was still present and active 
in over one hundred countries, where “its offices generally had the status of embassies.” For this 
reason, it “could still credibly claim to represent the Palestinian people.”40 Therefore, although 
the mass mobilization of the Intifada began spontaneously, the nationalist organizations that 
comprised the UNLU coalition could expect to harness and direct the uprising as it continued.41   
Just as Palestinian nationalist groups were beginning to organize under the UNLU 
coalition, young cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine also reacted to the start of the 
Intifada by forming Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, known by its acronym, Hamas. The 
Muslim Brotherhood had come to Palestine in 1935 when Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, sent his brother ‘Abd al-Rahman Al-Banna to Palestine to 
establish contacts in the region. Al-Banna believed Muslim nations could best face the 
challenges of modernity by rejecting hegemonic impositions, which included secularization and 
the rejection of indigenous cultural traditions, and by constructing modernity on Islamic 
principles. This notion forms the ideological basis of political Islam, or Islamism, a philosophy 
aimed as transforming society “to approximate as closely as possible that established by the 
Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. This would entail the establishment of an Islamic 
state, with no distinction being made between religion and government, with the Quran and the 
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sunna serving the basis for all aspects of life.”42  Therefore, while Islamism is based upon Islam, 
it is an inherently modern political philosophy in which Islam is mobilized to achieve political 
goals.  
Though for several decades, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine had focused its 
activities on largely non-political charitable endeavors, Hamas inextricably connected faith and 
politics, seeing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an inherently religious issue for pious Muslims.  
The Hamas Charter, published in 1988 after the start of the Intifada, outlined the movement’s 
ideological underpinnings and goals. In this document, Hamas adopted many of the PLO’s 
nationalistic values, but presented these ideas as an “Islamic platform,” casting them in “Islamic 
terminology and the Islamic belief system.”43 In its charter, Hamas asserted that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is the most recent conflict in a primordial struggle between the forces of 
Islam and the forces of evil, represented by the West and by Zionism, and called on Muslims to 
continue this ongoing and unending battle by fighting to ensure that all of historic Palestine 
remains under Muslim control, as the entire territory is an Islamic waqf, a religious trust, until 
the end of time. Additionally, because the land is a waqf, it is the responsibility of not only all 
Palestinians, but also of all Muslims, to fight for the liberation of Palestine from Israeli control. 
Members of Hamas are therefore those “Muslims who are devoted to Allah and worship Him” 
and who are “cognizant of their duty towards themselves, their families and country” to raise 
“the banner of Jihad [religious war] in the face of the oppressors in order to extricate the country 
and the people from the [oppressors’] desecration, filth and evil.” Consequently, Hamas rejects 
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in its charter any attempts at territorial compromise with Israel, asserting that those who 
renounce any part of the territory are also “renouncing part of the religion.” Hamas thus defines 
nationalism as “part and parcel of the religious faith,” merging the religious and the political, and 
maintains that the best way to fight the occupation is through a strengthening and revival of 
Islamic values in society. 44 
Related to the revival of Islamic values, Hamas defines two interrelated and 
complementary roles for women in the fight against Israeli occupation; those of mother and 
pious Muslim.  In its charter, Hamas argues that “Muslim women have a no lesser role than that 
of men in the war of liberation; they produce men and play a great role in guiding and educating 
the [new] generation.” Thus, Hamas defines the role of women in the movement as distinct but 
related to that of men. While men play a more active role in fighting through organizing and 
violent confrontation, women are responsible for raising children to become responsible and 
capable Muslims by “caring for the home and raising the children upon the moral concepts and 
values which derive from Islam; and of educating their sons to observe the religious injunctions 
in preparation for the duty of Jihad awaiting them.”45 To do this, women must strengthen their 
own religious resolve by rejecting Westernizing influences and ideas and relying instead on 
Islamic principles as a moral compass.46  
Alongside appropriating many of the PLO’s nationalist ideas, Hamas also stated in its 
charter that despite their ideological differences, cooperation with the PLO was essential to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  











larger project of liberating Palestine due to their shared national bond and nationalist aspirations. 
Article 27 of the charter asserted that Hamas would join completely with the PLO, should the 
latter adopt Islam but, even without this precondition, the charter argues that cooperation with 
the PLO is desirable in order to avoid fitna, or social unrest that would only aid their common 
enemy.47 
Much of Hamas’ ideology also stems from another Palestinian Islamist group, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, which was founded in Gaza in 1981. Like Hamas, Islamic Jihad also sought to 
establish a sovereign Palestinian state in all of the territory of historic Palestine, and understood 
the reassertion of Islam and Muslim values as an essential element to this mission. The 
movement also embraced armed resistance as the primary means of liberation of Palestine. 
However, unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad held as the ultimate goal the establishment of a pan-Arab 
Muslim state throughout the Middle East.  
At the start of the Intifada, Islamic Jihad materials described the uprising as originating 
from renewed Islamic piety brought on by both disillusionment with secular-nationalist 
leadership and the successes of Islamist movements throughout the region in the 1970s and 
1980s.48 Islamic Jihad and Hamas stressed their closeness to one another as “complimentary” 
Islamic movements that emerged not as competitors, but as colleagues.49  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid. 
 
48 Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2001), 25 – 28. 
 





Chapter 3 - Gendered Implications of Intifada Activism 
Growing up in the atmosphere of legal, political and economic repression created by 
Israeli occupation, young Palestinians, in their teens and early twenties in 1987, likely saw 
mobilization against Israel as one of the few options available to them to change their conditions 
of possibility. Reinhart Koselleck articulated the connection between past experiences and future 
conditions of possibility in his book The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, 
Spacing Concepts. Koselleck argues against the notion of a single historical timeline marching in 
a standard, unitary direction from past to future. Instead, he embraces the concept of multiplicity 
of time, the idea that many different “times” can exist simultaneously, defined and determined by 
subjective individual experiences and points of reference. These experiential differences create 
different conceivable “horizons of expectation” for the future, as human beings imagine future 
possibilities by referencing memories of past experiences. For Koselleck, “historical time” exists 
in the space “between experience and expectation” and describes potential, imagined futures as 
informed by the experiences of the past. These potential futures, the chance for action, or of 
change, or continuity, are conditions of possibility.50  In the context of Israeli occupation, the 
action of revolt against Israel can be understood as an attempt to change the kind of future that 
could be expected under continued occupation; that is, a future that offered only further 
repression and increasingly poor conditions. 
While Koselleck writes about different conditions of possibility within a larger argument 
about the study of history, his theses about multiple simultaneous conceptions of time, and the 
connection between past experiences and future expectations, can help explain the start of the 
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Intifada, and the active and continued participation of young people in it. In her essay on the 
culture of martyrdom that developed among young people during the First Intifada, Linda M. 
Pitcher interviewed a number of young Palestinians, asking them what the uprising meant to 
them and why they participated. Many of her subjects expressed feelings of hopelessness and 
frustration under occupation, and cited these feelings as the catalyst for their participation in the 
revolt. For instance, she quotes one young man named Hasan from Gaza, who told her “Listen: 
When you lose everything, your homeland, your freedom, your right to move freely, when the 
universities are closed and you can't go out at night... What can you do?” Another informant, the 
brother of a young woman killed by the Israeli Defense Forces, asserted that his sister “felt 
humiliated” by life under occupation.51 According to B’Tselem, 20% of Palestinians killed 
during the First Intifada were children under seventeen years old.52 Extrapolating from this data 
to account for the deaths of older youths, in their later teens or twenties, and other types of 
violence, such as nonlethal physical assault, we could reasonably argue that the involvement of 
young people in the uprising was quite widespread. 
The Intifada comprised many forms of protest and political action, which included both 
violent confrontations with Israeli forces in the form of rock throwing, and nonviolent means of 
protest, such as boycotts of Israeli goods and large scale strikes, led and enforced in large part by 
older teens and young adults. These young people were able to organize in such an efficient way 
due to the longstanding role student committees played in working with local communities 
within the Territories prior to the start of the Intifada. These student groups, organized through 
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various universities and schools and, allied with particular nationalist organizations, were 
involved with community service initiatives within their local areas. One of the better known 
student groups affiliated with Fatah, al-Shabiba, worked primarily in refugee camps and urban 
areas and “helped the population deal with day-to-day problems” caused by the occupation, such 
as establishing “adult literacy courses, cleaned streets and cemeteries, and helped repair and 
expand homes in villages and refugee camps.”53 These activities helped pave the way for 
widespread cooperation with youth-driven Intifada leadership by giving young leaders 
experience dealing with the issues facing local population groups and by eroding the power of 
older community leaders, who had previously acted as go-betweens for their communities and 
Israeli authorities.54 
Among young men and boys taking part in the more violent aspects of the Intifada, stone 
throwing activities were organized along a hierarchy of age. In her study of rock throwing in the 
Intifada, Leila Hudson demonstrates that these activities were guided by a predetermined set of 
responsibilities for boys of different ages. She observed that stone-throwing was primarily 
carried out by male “teen-agers ranging from approximately thirteen to eighteen” while “younger 
children were always present beforehand, eager to serve in some secondary function—chanting, 
building blockades, fetching tires or gasoline.”55 This age hierarchy is supported by Daoud 
Kuttab in his article “A Profile of the Stonethrowers,” in which he reports based on his 
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interviews that seven-to-ten year olds were charged with finding tires and lighting them on fire, 
which was seen as the least dangerous part of the confrontation. The eleven-to-fourteen year old 
group was tasked with placing large stones and other objects in the street in order to stop traffic. 
This group also frequently used slingshots to fire small stones at Israeli patrols. The fifteen-to-
nineteen year old group comprised “the veteran stone throwers” who “inflict the worst damage 
on passing cars” and are the “heart of the team,” consequently the most “sought after by 
Israelis.”  The final group, youths over the age of nineteen, play a strategic role by taking “key 
positions” at elevated points to determine which vehicles and groups should be attacked, and 
which to let go.56  
Although girls and women rarely took direct part in stone throwing alongside male 
youths, the Intifada provided young women with opportunities for political engagement, both to 
challenge Israeli occupation and patriarchal social norms within Palestinian society. In many 
cases, these activities also put them into direct and dangerous contact with Israeli forces. One 
way in which young women participated in the Intifada was through Popular Committees, which 
sought both to organize collective action, such as strikes, and to mitigate the hardship of Israeli 
measures against the territories in response to the uprising. In an essay on women’s action in 
Popular Committees during the Intifada, an anonymous female activist writer describes her 
experiences in the Committees, noting that these women’s groups organized to alleviate the 
pressures of strikes and boycotts and school closures. The committees taught classes on 
“planting, plant propagation, food preservation, household organization, writing, medical care” 
to prepare women to help their families grow food to substitute for products they no longer had 
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access to. The women’s groups also held classes for children during school closures. Most 
women participated in the uprising in some way, even through relatively small tasks like knitting 
sweaters for people arrested in protests.57 
Palestinian women also took part in direct engagement with Israeli forces by mediating 
between Israeli soldiers and young Palestinian men. In her study of motherhood during the 
Intifada, Julie Peteet shows that one of the primary ways in which women participated in the 
Intifada, at great personal risk, was by intervening to prevent the young men from being arrested 
or beaten. One woman she interviewed would go down to the street whenever she heard an 
altercation between Israeli soldiers and the youths of her refugee camp and urge the soldiers to 
leave the young man alone by tugging “at the soldiers, exhorting and pleading with them to stop. 
Armed only with determination and their voices, they hurl insults that challenge the humanity of 
the occupier.”58  
While young male stone throwers were the primary target of violence and arrest by Israeli 
forces during the Intifada, many girls and young women were also arrested and abused. In 
addition to the pain of a beating or the discomfort of prison detention, women also faced the 
possibility of sexual abuse in Israeli prisons. In her study of sexual harassment of adolescent 
Palestinian girls during the Intifada, Nadira Shalhoub Kevorkian interviews several young 
women who were the victims of rape and sexual harassment while in Israeli detention. She 
argues that the atmosphere of protest and activism prompted by the Intifada changed the meaning 
and implications of rape, at least during the early part of the Intifada. Traditional Arab notions of 
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female sexuality put the onus of preventing rape on women. If a woman were raped, the 
prevailing assumption would be that she had done something to instigate the attack. For this 
reason, she argues, her group of informants was as traumatized by the threat of rape as they were 
by the actual act, primarily because under normal social conditions, being a rape victim is 
considered shameful and would lower a woman’s social standing.59 However, within the context 
of the early Intifada, rape and sexual harassment of Palestinian women by Israelis was somewhat 
reconfigured into service to the national struggle as an act of bravery and sacrifice on the part of 
the young female victims. Nevertheless, the terror of rape and sexual harassment “threatened the 
physical, social, and mental well-being of female adolescents.” 60  
Intifada activism also provided a platform through which women could question and 
challenge patriarchal structures within Palestinian society. According to Samira Haj, this 
happened both individually and collectively. Many young women experienced a level of 
autonomy through their Intifada activism than they would normally experience, such as the 
freedom to interact with men, “unrestricted mobility and employment outside the home.” 
Collectively, the atmosphere of political engagement of the Intifada made it easier for female 
activists to call attention to women’s issues, “especially in regard to property rights (e.g., legal 
title to the land) and personal rights (e.g., the right to divorce).”61 For many female activists, 
therefore, the Intifada was thus endowed with possibility not only of liberation from Israeli 
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control, but also the hope that in whatever new order emerged from the Intifada, women might 







Chapter 4 - Nationalist and Islamist Discourse on the Intifada 
Both Palestinian nationalist organizations and Hamas recognized that the sudden 
outbreak of the Intifada represented a unique moment in the history of the Palestinian struggle. 
The civilian generated uprising, and the very active role of young people in the protests, created 
a special crisis situation for Israel, in which its normal military responses proved ineffective both 
to suppress the uprising and to retain sympathy for Israel. Consequently, a large portion of the 
press coverage and images of the uprising circulating internationally concerned the role of 
children and young adults. Particularly important were images and footage of Israeli soldiers 
violently attacking young people and children armed only with stones and other found objects. 
The uneven violence of these encounters brought harsh criticism to the Israeli government, by 
both the international community and by liberal Israelis who considered these tactics cruel and 
overblown, while at the same time creating sympathy toward the Palestinian cause. 
Since its start, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured prominently in the international 
press. The reality of this international attention created the “powerful belief on both sides of this 
conflict that the struggle over the news media can be just as important as the battle on the 
ground.” That is, both Israelis and Palestinians were aware that “they are playing to an 
international audience and, as always, there is a major struggle over who should be cast as 
aggressor and who as victim.”62 Through the news media, each side could seek to portray itself 
as the true victim of the conflict and garner international support for its cause. For Israel, the 
main concern was “convincing its Western allies of the legitimacy of its actions, exerting 
effective damage control to reduce the exposure of the Israeli army's operations.” By contrast, 
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Palestinians have traditionally seen the international press as an equalizing force, one that could 
enable them to compensate for their material disadvantages in relation to Israel with sympathy 
and solidarity.63 The Intifada provided a perfect international public relations opportunity for the 
Palestinian resistance as images of young people confronting the IDF circulated in the press. 
“Footage showing Israeli soldiers using huge stones to crush the bones of two young Palestinians 
in handcuffs gained international support for the uprising” and effectively challenged the hitherto 
dominant narrative of Israeli victimhood.64  
In response to the images and reports of Israel military tactics in the Territories, the 
United Nations issued Resolution 43/21 in November 1988, which was supported by the majority 
of the General Assembly. In this resolution, the UN asserted that Israeli practice and policies 
related to the uprising constituted a human rights violation, and censured Israel in particular for 
“opening of fire by the Israeli army and settlers that result in the killing and wounding of 
defenceless Palestinian civilians, the beating and breaking of bones, the deportation of 
Palestinian civilians, the imposition of restrictive economic measures, the demolition of houses, 
collective punishment and detentions, as well as denial of access to the media.”65 The document 
went on to call for Israel to abide by Geneva Convention agreements and protect the Palestinian 
civilian population from violence and persecution. 
These images also prompted a reappraisal of the occupation of Palestine by many Israelis. 
In the first place, the ongoing protest activity by Palestinians in the Territories despite the harsh 
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reactions of the IDF seemed to send a strong message to Israel that peace would not be possible 
under the status quo of occupation. The unrest in the Territories helped to create a sense among 
many Israelis that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were “zones of insecurity” that should be 
avoided, creating a greater consciousness of the “Green Line,” the pre-1967 border that separated 
Israel from its Arab neighbors. In short, for many Israelis, the Territories no longer truly felt like 
a part of their country. Beyond this new consciousness of the Green Line and a view of the 
Territories as something distinct from the rest of Israel, media images of Israeli military tactics 
against Palestinians created a sense among many Israelis that they were viewing the true and 
brutal nature of the occupation for the first time.66 Taken together, the Intifada created a shift in 
Israeli public opinion towards greater support of territorial compromise and the possible 
establishment of some sort of independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories.67 
 While UNLU and Hamas recognized the opportunity presented by the Intifada, they 
seem to have reacted to it in different ways. However, both approaches served to bring young 
male activists to the center of the uprising. For nationalist organizations, well-known 
internationally and well-established among Palestinians in the Territories and the diaspora, the 
Intifada created the opportunity to present themselves as the legitimate leadership of the uprising, 
and thus the true voice of the Palestinian national movement, both at home and abroad. This 
public relations opportunity was made especially powerful by the participation of young people, 
and in particular the activities of boys and male adolescents that were already circulating 
internationally. As such, the PLO and its affiliate organizations sought to empower young male 
activists on a discursive level, referencing and praising them in their public relations materials, 
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but seeking practical power for their own leadership both within the Palestinian community and 
internationally. By contrast, Hamas’ approach to the Intifada seems to have been much more 
locally orientated and focused on offering young male activists a greater sense of purpose to their 
activism as a Muslim religious obligation, as well as the practical authority to surveil local areas 
and actualize Hamas’ social program.   
International press coverage of the Intifada presented nationalist organizations with the 
opportunity to position themselves as the true leaders of the uprising and as the sole legitimate 
representatives of the Palestinian people. Consequently, public relations materials issued by 
Palestinian nationalist organizations during the First Intifada had two main aims; to direct the 
protest activities of the Intifada within the Territories and to expand upon the imagery of young 
protestors already circulating internationally in order to grow support for both the uprising and 
for nationalist leadership. 
Within the Territories, UNLU sought to bring the Intifada under its control through the 
publication of leaflets, or bayanat, which offered instructions for and organization to Intifada 
protest activities as well as a secular-nationalist thematic conceptualization of the uprising. 
During the first year of the Intifada, UNLU issued thirty-one leaflets, an average of two or three 
per month, which enjoyed circulation around the Territories.68 According to Shaul Mishal and 
Reuben Aharoni, the UNLU leaflets were quite effective in influencing Intifada activism; calling 
for boycotts, strikes, and marches as strategic tactics. The vast majority of these calls were for 
various forms of non-violent action, with only 8 of the 163 total bayanat calling for some kind of 
violence, mostly in the forms of “stone throwing and petrol bombs.”69 In Leaflet 24, for instance, 
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UNLU set the Intifada agenda for the summer of 1988, calling for particular protest activities on 
certain significant dates, such as “August 30 – General strike in solidarity with the deportees 
(deported from the Territories by Israel)” and “September 1 – On this day, the detainees will 
declare a hunger strike to protest their detention conditions.”70  Similarly, Leaflet 28 lists dates of 
planned protests through November 1988, declaring Israeli Election Day, November 1, 1988, “a 
general strike day.” This leaflet also orders all people to “take to the streets to celebrate the 
publication of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence” on November 15.71  
An analysis of the gendered language of the UNLU bayanat reveals the discursive 
centrality of the protest activity of young males, while women are mainly considered in relation 
to men, as their mothers and supporters. For instance, Leaflet 29 proclaims, “Let the mother of 
the martyr rejoice; she has lifted her voice twice; first on the day of her son’s death, and again on 
the day of the declaration of the state (of Palestine).”72 Similarly, Leaflet 5 refers to “Palestinian 
mothers, sisters, and daughters as ‘manabit,’ or the soil on which ‘manhood, respect, and 
dignity’ grow” and encourages women to work alongside their male relatives to liberate 
Palestine.73 In Leaflet 12, the success of the Intifada is credited to “the children and young men 
of the stones and Molotov cocktails” and “thousands of women who miscarried as a result of 
poison gas and tear gas grenades, and those women whose sons and husbands were thrown in the 
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Nazi prisons."74 Thus, the UNLU leaflets endow men with the primary agency and initiative of 
the Intifada, while women are considered mainly through their role as mothers and caregivers of 
men. In this way, these communiqués reflect longstanding notions of gendered nationalism, in 
particular the idea of an active citizenship, conceived of as male, and a passive female nation, 
understood as a mother or lover. Female citizens, then, though encouraged to activism, are urged 
to do so through their relationships to men and through the childbearing capacities of their 
bodies, which does not actually or accurately reflect the full scope of female participation in the 
Intifada. 
The second main aspect of the nationalist response was a public relations campaign, 
designed to generate support for the Intifada both among Palestinians and the international 
community. One aspect of this public relations campaign was the production of political poster 
art for circulation within the Territories and abroad. These political posters accessed the popular 
images of young Palestinian male protesters already circulating in the press, often depicting 
images of young men, stones, slingshots, and stone-ravaged walls, accompanied by a slogan or 
message connecting the action of throwing a stone to the possibility of national freedom and 
independence. Using vivid colors and typically abstracted, graphic images, poster art represented 
a powerful and important visual representation of the Intifada and those people who took part in 
it.  An analysis of these images demonstrates that these posters accessed certain set visual motifs, 
which developed symbolically into a kind of Intifada iconography that directly referenced 
Palestinian male youth and thereby endowed young male protestors with symbolic power as the 
main force of the uprising and Palestinian national aspirations. Concurrently, by issuing these 
images, Palestinian nationalist leadership claimed symbolic ownership of the activism of young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






males, establishing themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Intifada and, therefore, the 
Palestinian people. 
A survey of Palestinian nationalist poster art produced during the first Intifada reveals the 
use of several visual motifs, which repeat time and again. These visual motifs are images of 
stones or hands gripping stones, men holding stones, stone-riddled walls, and slingshots. These 
motifs referenced the street protests undertaken primarily by young Palestinian men and boys 
and, as such, became visually symbolic of male youth. The first motif, images of stones or hands 
gripping stones, repeats with special frequency in these posters. The PLO produced one such 
image, titled “The Intifada Continues,” in 1993 (Figure 1).75 This poster shows a hand gripping a 
stone emerging from a patterned field, which references the pattern of the keffiyeh, the 
traditional Bedouin head covering adopted as a Palestinian nationalist symbol during the Arab 
Revolt of the 1930s.76 Behind the hand, a nude male figure emerges, reaching toward the sky 
with both hands, grasping the Palestinian flag. Another poster, produced by The Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (Figure 2)77 shows a hand grasping a stone in the left foreground 
of the image. Set against a crisp blue sky, this hand seems poised to release the stone and let it 
fly like the other stones in the background of the image. Palestinian flags trail behind these rocks. 
A third example of this motif can be seen in a poster, also produced by The Popular Front for the 
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Liberation of Palestine (Figure 3),78 which shows a stylized floral image, with keffiyeh petals 
and a stone pistil. The caption below reads “The Blossoms of Freedom.” Finally, a fourth 
example is an image produced by Fatah in 1989 for the second anniversary of the Intifada 
(Figure 4).79 Set against a visually threatening red background, and encircled by a barbed wire 
Star of David, a lone hand holds up a gray stone.  
Another common motif featured in these artworks is a full-body depiction of young men 
holding or throwing stones. One poster produced by the PLO (Figure 5),80 for instance, shows a 
male figure holding a stone in his right hand, his face covered with the keffiyeh. The figure 
stands in front of a destroyed stone structure, crumbling except for its metal supports, to which a 
Palestinian flag is tied. The caption below reads “My home... in the shadow of your wreckage... I 
remain steadfast!”  Another image (Figure 6),81 published by Fatah, shows a group of young 
men, wrapped in keffiyeh, holding up stones over a stylized background that includes the 
Palestinian flag. The caption reads, “Victory for the heroes of the stones.”  A third example, 
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Steadfast, c. 1989, Palestinian Liberation Organization. Available from: The Palestinian Poster 
Project Archives. Accessed December 5, 2013. http://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/in-
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produced by The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Figure 7)82 shows three male 
figures, heads wrapped in scarves and hands clutching stones, in a style referent to Picasso’s 
Guernica. The caption below reads “Defeat Fascism.” 
Another motif is the stone-riddled wall, which shows the results of protest action, rather 
than the activity itself. For instance, one poster published by The Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (Figure 8)83 shows a young Palestinian man, his head wrapped in the 
keffiyeh, peaking out over a stone-riddled and blood splattered wall. Another example, published 
by the PLO (Figure 9)84 brings a blood-splattered wall to the far foreground. The stones in this 
image occupy all of the space of the image, with the exception of a small patch of blue sky at the 
top left. 
A final motif one finds in these posters is the image of a slingshot. In the images that 
utilize this imagery, the slingshot is often represented on its own, but is sometimes shown 
alongside a stone or in the process of shooting a stone. One example of a poster accessing this 
motif is an image produced in 1989 for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Fatah (Figure 10).85 Here, 
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a slingshot and a Palestinian flag are shown held erect by a collection of gray stones. Another 
image, produced by Fatah, shows the Palestinian flag as a slingshot (Figure 11)86 with a caption 
reading “No voice stronger (higher) than the voice of the intifada.” A third example, found in a 
poster published by The Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (Figure 12)87 shows a hand 
holding a slingshot rising up from a collection of gray stones. The other hand appears in mid-
motion, having just released the stone that moves across the canvas from right to left.  
In drawing on imagery related to stones, these visual motifs were evocative of male youth 
and the role of young men and boys in the uprising. These motifs acted as shorthand symbols, 
meant to represent young Palestinian men, thereby placing young men at the symbolic center of 
not just the Intifada, but of a new Palestinian national movement that would be centered in the 
Territories. These iconographic images also played on and co-opted Israeli nationalist themes, in 
particular the story of David and Goliath, using this narrative for the Palestinian national cause. 
Finally, this iconography served a political purpose by symbolically connecting the street 
protests of primarily young men to nationalist organizations and their leadership.  
Visual motives related to stones referenced the form of protest widely used by youth and 
associated with youth in the Palestinian popular mind. In addition, many poster images, such as 
Figures 8 and 9 also referenced the dangers youth faced from the Israeli Defense Forces while 
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throwing their stones.  According to historian Avi Shlaim, Israeli Defense Forces responded to 
attacks with rocks and other debris with deadly force, using the “full panoply of crowd control 
measures” including beatings, “tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition.”88 
For young people involved in the Intifada, participation was thus a very dangerous endeavor, 
which often resulted in severe injury and death.  In her article on young people in the Intifada, 
Linda M. Pitcher’s interviews with young, politically active Palestinians suggest how dangerous 
confronting Israeli forces could be. One of her young informants talked about how his ever-
present fear of arrest by the Israeli Defense Forces left him always “looking over [his] shoulder”. 
Indeed, thousands of young Palestinians were arrested en masse during the Intifada and placed in 
detention in Israeli prisons. Other informants spoke with horror at some of the tactics used by 
Israeli forces to stifle protest, such as intentionally breaking bones.  Additionally, many of her 
subjects had lost friends and family members to the Israeli Defense Forces during street protests. 
One young man recounted the death of his sister, who was shot by Israeli soldiers. In another 
interview, a woman talks about the death of her son, who was killed by Israeli soldiers in a case 
of mistaken identity.89 Indeed, by 1988 several hundred Palestinians had been killed by Israeli 
forces, many of them children under seventeen years old.90  
These images also evoke youth through their reference to the story of David and Goliath. 
In this story, the young David confronts the giant Goliath, killing him with a stone to the 
forehead. This theme is especially evident in images that include a slingshot, the weapon 
traditionally associated with David’s victory. This story is, in a sense, the ultimate tale of the 
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power of cunning and daring male youth. Here, David, the future king of ancient Israel, is a 
simple young shepherd confronted with a much more powerful enemy he ultimately defeats with 
ingenuity and a simple weapon, the symbolic antecedent to the war of stones taking place during 
the Intifada. In addition to the images mentioned above, several posters directly reference this 
theme, for instance the Fatah poster “Daoud (David) wa Jaloot (Goliath)” (Figure 13).91 While 
this image does not contain any of the motifs mentioned earlier, it is also evocative of male youth 
through its representation of this ancient story. This image shows a boy, David, standing 
alongside a heavily armed Israeli Goliath. Here, David is represented as a very young boy, much 
shorter and smaller than his foe. Young David casually holds a slingshot and looks away, his 
facial expression one of confidence and cunning. By contrast, the heavily armored Israeli Goliath 
lifts his hand to his face in chagrin, appearing ridiculous next to his young foe. 
In addition to referencing youth, this theme also co-opts the Israeli national myth, in 
which Israel is likened to David, doing battle against the many Goliaths looking to destroy it. 
According to Israeli historian Ilan Pappe, Israeli’s foundation as a state has been mythologized in 
the official Israeli historiography. In this historical narrative, the 1948 conflict between Israel, 
Palestinian Arabs, and neighboring Arab states represented a kind of “David and Goliath war”92 
from which Israel emerged the winner. These poster images, which draw on this theme, make a 
statement about both the land and this traditional historical narrative. First, the physical space of 
modern-day Israel-Palestine is the same geographic setting as the story of David and Goliath, 
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bringing the land question to the forefront in these images. Secondly, in referencing this story, 
which is religiously important to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike, and symbolically important 
to the Israeli national myth, these posters mock Israel’s self-image, calling on this theme to 
instead represent the Palestinian cause. 
These images also allowed nationalist organizations to symbolically claim this protest 
activity as its own, emanating from its leadership and direction. This claim was important not 
only within the Territories, but also for its international relations as it sought to capitalize 
politically on the events of the Intifada, which showed Israel and the world that Israel’s 
continued occupation of Palestinian territories was “not without significant costs from the 
viewpoint of the Jewish state.”93 
Consequently, the PLO sought to present a diplomatic peace plan, based on the events of 
the Intifada, which could induce Israel to agree to withdraw from the Territories. According to 
Mark Tessler, Palestinians “had shown serious interest in a two-state solution since the mid-
1970s, and the PLO had since the 1982 Arab summit in Fez been officially committed to mutual 
recognition between Israel and a Palestinian state located in the West Bank and Gaza, with East 
Jerusalem as its capital.”94 Throughout 1988, PLO leaders and associates made various 
statements in support of mutual recognition and a two-state solution, which were intended to 
convince Israel and the United States of its moderate stance and willingness to negotiate. In June 
1988 Bassam Abu Sharif, a close political adviser of Yasser Arafat, published a statement calling 
for a two-state solution and for international guarantees to ensure peace. Another statement, by 
Faysal Husayni, head of the Arab Studies Society in Jerusalem and close associate of Arafat, also 
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promoted the idea of a two-state solution and laid out a detailed plan for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state, with Arafat as its president and leaders from the UNLU coalition as members 
of a legislative body.95 These attempts to initiate diplomatic talks on the basis of a two-state 
solution culminated in the November 1988 Declaration of Independence for the State of 
Palestine, issued by Arafat at the nineteenth session of the Palestinian National Council, the 
legislative branch of the PLO. Here, the PNC formally affirmed its desire to pursue a two-state 
solution, and also called for an international peace conference, for Israeli withdrawal from 
Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967, for the settlement of the issue of Palestinian 
refugees from the 1948 war, and for UN guarantees of peace and security in the region.96 
The Declaration also reveals the PLO assertion that the events of the Intifada were the 
basis for a proposed peace settlement and the organization’s claim over those events as 
justification for its leadership. In the declaration, the PNC asserted that through the events of the 
Intifada, the Palestinian people affirmed their “deeply rooted national unity and their full 
adherence to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the sole, legitimate representative of our 
people, all our people, wherever they congregate in our homeland or outside it” through “the 
participation of the Palestinian masses – their unions, their vocational organisations, their 
students, their workers, their farmers, their women, their merchants, their landlords, their 
artisans, their academics – in the intifada through its Unified National Command and the popular 
committees that were formed in the urban neighbourhoods, the villages, and the camps.” What is 
more, the “struggle of the children of the RPGs outside our homeland and the struggle of the 
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children of the sacred stones inside it blend into a single revolutionary melody,” which “have 
destroyed the illusion our people’s enemies have harboured that they can turn the occupation of 
Palestinian land into a permanent fait accompli and consign the Palestinian issue to oblivion.”97 
Thus, the Declaration argued that the chance for peace and the establishment of a Palestinian 
state was made possible through the events and activism of the Intifada, in particular the actions 
and deeds of the young men of the stones, which, in turn, was only possible through the 
longstanding leadership of the PLO, Palestinians’ sole legitimate representative. By the start of 
1989, the PLO had begun tenuous talks with the United States based on the notion of a two-state 
solution.98 
For its part, Hamas seems to have taken a different approach to the Intifada, focusing 
more intently on local engagement of young male activists, rather than on international politics. 
Initially, many Palestinians were mistrustful of Hamas, as rumors circulated that they were being 
funded by Israel as a way to undermine nationalist leadership.99 Thus, Hamas cooperated with 
UNLU directives during the first year of the uprising, and only began to gain influence and 
power after the PLO began making overtures of peace and territorial compromise with Israel, 
which many Palestinians rejected and which Hamas staunchly opposed. Beginning in 1988, 
Hamas started competing with UNLU for control over day-to-day agenda of the Intifada. They 
issued rival bayanat, which described the protest activity of the Intifada, and the Palestinian 
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struggle more broadly, in Islamic religious and historical terms and argued against any peace 
agreement that would include territorial compromise or recognition of Israel.  
Whereas UNLU leaflets generally stressed the common nationalist aims and modern 
history of all Palestinians, Hamas instead framed the uprising in religious terms. Hamas 
materials referenced personalities and events from ancient Islamic history to argue for continued 
rebellion.100 Additionally, while UNLU leaflets stressed the commonalities of Muslims and 
Christians, Hamas materials used language specific to an Islamic context. For instance, in Hamas 
leaflet number 4, Hamas calls upon “our Muslim people on our soil purified with the blood of the 
Companions of the Prophet.”101 In several other leaflets, Hamas references ribat, Muslims who 
“settled in countryside during the period of the Muslims conquests to defend the borders,”102 
beginning the communiqués by addressing “Muslims on the soil of the ribat” and imploring 
them to action to continue with protests in the name of Islam.103 Likewise, Hamas framed its 
opposition to compromise with Israel in its bayanat in Islamic terms, stating that renouncing any 
part of the land of Palestine would constitute “a concession of a principle and a recognition of 
the usurping murderers’ false claim to a land”104 and evidence of weakness of “Arab boldness or 
Muslim strength.”105 The only solution was the continued use of force. 
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Hamas bayanat made fewer explicit mentions of women or of gendered views of the 
Intifada and the roles of men and women in the struggle, relying instead on religious Islamic 
references and imagery. However, a careful reading of Hamas leaflets show that Hamas saw the 
primary actors of the Intifada to be young men, and framed criticism of the nationalist leadership 
as a betrayal of both the Palestinian people generally and of these young male activists in 
particular. Leaflet 45, for instance, Hamas referred to “our sons the pupils” as “the beacons of 
knowledge, the way of integrity and light, the hopes of this nation” and implored students to 
organize their time so that, despite school closures, they may continue to study and learn and 
attend school whenever possible so that the schools “will continue to be natural hothouses for 
shaping the generations and building the nation and raising its sons on the basis of the 
knowledge, the morality, the nobility, and the manliness which God wanted the Islamic nation to 
possess.”106 Elsewhere, Hamas leaflets called upon the “sons of our heroic Palestinian people”107 
and “Brothers of Islam on the road to liberation.”108  
Additionally, Hamas’ criticism of the nationalist leadership was framed as a betrayal of 
these young male activists. In a “Special Leaflet” from November 1988, Hamas called on “our 
brothers… the members of the National Council” and criticized the nationalist leadership for 
considering a peace settlement with Israel, asking, “which of the martyrs authorized you? … 
which of the widows has approached you in supplication?” The Leaflet went on to condemn any 
negotiation or settlement with Israel as “a sword in the back of the children of the stones.”109  
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Likewise, another “Special Leaflet” from April 1990 was written from the perspective of 
a Hamas fighter held in an Israeli prison and criticizes the PLO and Fatah for their treatment of 
Hamas fighters in detention. The writer claimed that PLO and Fatah fighters and organizers in 
prison prevent Hamas fighters from accessing any of the small comforts the nationalist groups 
secure for their own people, such as “[activity within the framework of] the national, 
educational, sports, and other committees, and even the service committees” as well as “winter 
clothes… and writing utensils.” What is more, the writer accused nationalist detainees of 
“prohibiting some of the Muslim young people from delivering the Friday khutba (sermon),” 
while taking that privilege for themselves even though, the bayan claims, “some of the 
(nationalist) preachers of the khutba are not worshippers.”110 
Like UNLU, Hamas also sought to encourage, direct, and lay claim to the activism of 
young males, albeit in a slightly different way; by empowering young male activists to actualize 
Hamas’ program of social Islamization. In its charter, Hamas defined nationalism as “part and 
parcel of the religious faith,” merging the religious and the political, and maintained that the best 
way to fight the occupation is through a strengthening and revival of Islamic values in society, so 
that enemy forces cannot erode and weaken Muslim society and “confuse the thinking of 
Muslims, revile their heritage, discredit their ideals, to be followed by a military invasion.”111 
According to Gilles Kepel, Islamist movements frequently use laws and regulations related to 
women as a gauge with which to determine how Islamic a society is. For Islamist groups, these 
laws typically relate to personal status issues, such as divorce, child custody, and marriage, and 
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women’s dress in public spaces. As such, visible symbols of Islamic female piety, especially the 
hijab, or headscarf, carry important social and political significance. Thus, calls by Islamist 
groups for society to become more pious and devout are often framed as calls for women to 
adopt Islamic dress, sometimes instituted into law, as in Iran under the Islamist regime there, and 
other times strongly encouraged through social pressure.112 For Hamas, the hijab is considered 
an integral part of Palestinian indigenous culture, and its adoption does not represent an 
imposition of Islamic dress on society, but rather a “restoration” of the headscarf to its traditional 
place. Said Khalid Meshal, head of the Hamas political bureau, explained Hamas’ position on the 
hijab in a 2009 interview, saying that Hamas “derives its vision from the people's culture and 
religion” and thus “features of religion in Gaza society are genuine and spontaneous; they have 
not been imposed by any authority other than the faith and conviction of the observant.”113 
Nevertheless, Hamas has actively sought to promote the adoption of Islamic dress among women 
from its inception. 
During the First Intifada, Hamas adopted a policy of social Islamization that encouraged 
women to adopt the hijab as both a statement of religious conviction and nationalist commitment 
and empowered young men to enforce this policy. According to Rema Hammami, under Hamas’ 
influence the hijab took on new meanings and significations in Palestine. She argues that while 
many Palestinian women had always worn a type of headscarf as a matter of tradition, the 
headscarf was generally a marker of age and social and regional background, rather than a 
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political statement. By contrast, Hamas’ positions on female modesty during the Intifada created 
a social and political landscape that endowed female Islamic dress with a new, political meaning. 
It became a sign of resistance to the occupation, homogenized in a style of long overcoat known 
colloquially as “shari’a dress, which have no precedents in indigenous Palestinian dress,” and 
women from all social, economic, and age groups were encouraged to adopt it equally.114  
Hamas framed these calls for Islamic dress within a larger discourse of resistance and 
uprising, and relied upon young male activists, operating through informal neighborhood 
channels, to promote and enforce Islamic dress among women during the Intifada years. Graffiti 
with slogans such as “Daughter of Islam, abide by Shari’a Dress”115 and “Hamas Considers the 
Unveiled to be Collaborators with the Enemy”116 appeared on walls in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and groups of young men circulated in neighborhoods harassing and in some cases 
attacking uncovered women.117 Rema Hammami asserts that the social and political atmosphere 
of pressure to adopt Islamic dress created during the First Intifada had created a situation in 
which even those women most resistant to the headscarf had begun wearing it “in certain 
contexts, solely out of fear.” She describes one incident, related to her by a woman from a 
refugee camp in Gaza, in which she got into a fight with a gang of boys when she left the house 
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uncovered.118 Hamas thus provided young activists with a meaningful symbolic religious 
framework with which to understand the importance of their activism, as well as the authority to 
Islamize local areas. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Chapter 5 - Building a Masculine Intifada 
 
 The centrality of the activism of boys and young men in the discourse of Palestinian 
nationalist organizations and in the social policies of Hamas had three main consequences. First, 
the focus on male youth activism helped to shape participation in the Intifada into a masculine 
rite of passage from childhood into adulthood. Second, the shebab – young male activists – 
responded to their perceived importance to the uprising through increasingly violent 
confrontations with Israeli forces. Third, this focus on male activism problematized active and 
public female participation in the Intifada as a possible threat to the sustainability of the uprising, 
driving female activists out of the public space and masculinizing the Intifada itself. 
While it is difficult if not impossible to quantitatively determine to what degree the 
importance of male youth activism in both Intifada discourse and policy influenced the actions 
and attitudes of young men themselves, Ian Hacking’s “Looping Effect” theory suggests that 
social groups – in this case, the shebab – are aware of the ideas circulating about them and 
respond to these ideas in a variety of ways. It is therefore possible that the steady images and 
imagery of shebab circulating in UNLU and Hamas bayanat and in UNLU posters, and the 
empowerment of young men by Hamas to Islamize their local areas, prompted changes in the 
shebab and how they thought of themselves and their activism. One piece of evidence to support 
this idea is the development of Intifada activism as a masculine rite of passage, marking the 
transition from boyhood to manhood. Several anthropological studies have reported on this 
phenomenon during the Intifada, arguing that to take part in Intifada activism was to assert one’s 
manhood and achieve the social standing of an adult man at a very young age. According to 
Leila Hudson, the Intifada developed into a “self-initiated test of manhood” in a society under 





grew older, they took on greater responsibility in the protests and stone throwing, writing that 
“children who chanted slogans two years ago are throwing stones now, and the shabab who 
threw stones can now sell their labor in the so-called ‘slave-markets’ of Tel Aviv, safe in the 
knowledge that they are men.”119 Julie Peteet expands upon this dynamic, arguing that taking 
part in the violence of the Intifada, both as perpetrators and victims, represented an important rite 
of passage for young Palestinian males that transformed them socially from children to full men 
empowered by their communities with “responsibility for community affairs, mainly such tasks 
as mediation in disputes and participating in popular tribunals to try suspected collaborators,” all 
tasks that, traditionally, would fall to much older men.120   
Similarly, the prominence of poor and working class shebab also challenged traditional 
class relationships. While Intifada activism encompassed all segments of Palestinian society, 
those in the forefront of the movement were “subaltern male youths from the refugee camps, 
villages, and urban popular quarters,” and thus not from among the traditional urban political 
elite who would, under normal circumstances, have “striven for leadership.” 121 Additionally, 
under Israeli occupation, many of these elites had acted as interlocutors between Israeli 
authorities and the local Palestinian population through various networks of patronage.122 Julie 
Peteet asserts that the bodily experiences of violence that served as a rite of passage for so many 
young men from poor and working class backgrounds was less commonly experienced by 
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members of more privileged classes. Thus, within the context of the Intifada, these elites who 
had not been “credentialized by violence” became the objects of scorn by members of the lower 
classes who faced such violence every day.123  
The second piece of evidence to suggest that the shebab responded to their central place 
in the Intifada is the increasing violence on the part of the shebab during the final years of the 
uprising, particularly against alleged Palestinian collaborators with Israel. According to a report 
by Human Rights Watch, “an estimated 822 alleged collaborators died at the hands of other 
Palestinians between 1988 and April 1994.”124 Many of these were accused of collaboration with 
Israel not so much due to any actual proof of collaboration, but due to involvement in unsavory 
trades, such as prostitution and drugs, or due to longstanding personal vendettas. While difficult 
to qualify this type of violence, sources suggest that the primary source of violence against 
suspected collaborators was “less disciplined youth who assumed a larger role in the Intifada 
after more mature leaders were imprisoned.”125 This development suggests not only that the local 
organization and leadership that had been in place at the start of the Intifada had broken down 
over the course of the uprising, leaving space for younger and perhaps less politically mature 
activists to take their places, but also that younger boys had internalized a particularly violent 
interpretation of their national duty. What is more, the widespread understanding of Intifada 
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activism as a form of male initiation into adulthood suggests that not just daring, cunning, and 
strength, but also violence, had become an important part of that masculine image. 
Finally, this focus on male activism served to problematize the active and public 
participation of women in the Intifada.  According to Amal Amireh, calls for women to veil 
during the Intifada represented a desire to re-empower young men in an exclusive role as active 
actors in the uprising. Amireh asserts that because the “front” of the Intifada was the home – the 
neighborhoods, streets, and houses of the Occupied Territories – and not some far off battle field, 
women were active participants in the movement, taking part in rallies, demonstrations, rock 
throwing, and boycotts alongside men. However, politically active women were at odds with the 
traditional image of the “Palestinian freedom fighter,” a strong male hero sacrificing his life for 
the homeland. Female activists were consequently problematized during the second stage of the 
Intifada as a possible weakness to the national movement in Palestine, particularly because they 
were imagined as sexually vulnerable. Stories about women working as double agents for Israel, 
using sex to recruit young Palestinian men as Israeli collaborators, circulated in Intifada 
discourse. Likewise, the threat of rape in Israeli prisons and detention centers was thought to 
leave women vulnerable to forced collaboration. Amireh argues that to protect the Intifada from 
collaboration, it became important to re-domesticate and re-feminize women through the 
headscarf.126 Although the hijab does not inherently prohibit or prevent women from being 
politically active, the concurrent empowerment of male activists to police public spaces created 
an unwelcome and threatening atmosphere in which women were attacked and harassed for their 
dress as well as for their known political allegiances. 
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Although not in favor of the hijab campaign and attacks on women, nationalist leadership 
took no steps to directly confront and end this program. UNLU Leaflet 43 looked to address to 
issue of the hijab in August 1989, after a series of well-publicized attacks on women earlier that 
summer, which consisted of attacks on bareheaded women and on covered women who were 
known to be very politically active. UNLU Leaflet 43 called for the end of attacks on women, 
calling such attacks “disputes” that “serve the enemy and his collaborators.” Soon after, “graffiti 
appeared on the walls in Gaza proclaiming: ‘Those caught throwing stones at women will be 
treated as collaborators,’ and ‘Women have a great role in the intifada and we must respect 
them.’”  Nevertheless, despite this criticism of attacks on women, UNLU did not take any 
practical steps to prevent women from being accosted. According to Rema Hammami, many 
politically active women believed that UNLU avoided taking concrete action because it preferred 
to focus on maintaining the initiative in the “national consensus” while ignoring more divisive 
issues such as women’s rights and religion raised by the Islamists.127 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
In total, the empowerment of young male activists both as the discursive heart of the 
Intifada and as agents of Hamas’ social policy transformed the Intifada itself into a symbolically 
masculine endeavor, one that defined and created manhood and increasingly excluded 
femininity, despite the very active involvement of women in all aspects of the uprising. At the 
same time, accessing the activism of young men enabled the nationalist and Islamist leaderships 
to lay claim on the Intifada and bolster their claims to speak for and lead the Palestinian people, 
claims that benefited both nationalist leaders and Hamas in the years following the end of the 
Intifada. 
The Intifada ended on September 13, 1993 when the state of Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Declaration of Principles of the Oslo Peace Accords. 
The Declaration of Principles established a framework through which the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict could eventually be resolved via a two-state solution. With the Oslo Accords, the PLO, 
under the direction of Yasser Arafat, recognized Israel’s right to exist and formally renounced 
terrorism, and Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people. Israel agreed to deploy their troops away from Palestinian population centers, and grant 
Palestinians self-rule in certain areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A year later, the Gaza 
Jericho Agreement established the Palestinian Authority, the interim ruling body for Palestinian 
lands. Hamas strongly rejected the peace process, criticizing the secular nationalist PLO for 
compromising on Palestinian land and for acknowledging Israel’s right to exist.128 Although 
secular nationalist Fatah dominated the Palestinian Authority elections, surveys taken in Gaza 
and the West Bank in the 1990s and early 2000s indicate that support among Palestinians in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Occupied Territories for Hamas’ leadership remained quite high throughout this period. One 
survey, conducted in October 1993, aiming to gauge how Palestinians would vote if elections 
were held that day, determined that 13.3% of those surveyed would have voted for a Hamas-
affiliated candidate.129 Another poll held the following month, in November 1993, found that 
14.6% of respondents would vote for a Hamas candidate.130 Another poll taken a year later, in 
1994, shows that, although support for Hamas fell by around 3%, 10% of those surveyed would 
support a Hamas candidate.131 While support for Fatah and other nationalist organizations 
remained consistently much higher than support for Hamas during these years, the fact that 
Hamas could become even the third or fourth most likely choice only a few years after its 
founding speaks to the group’s legitimacy in the eyes of many people and its perceived ability to 
lead. Support for Hamas continued to grow as Palestinians became frustrated by the peace 
process and observed the ineptitude of the nationalist Palestinian Authority government in 
comparison to the efficiency of Hamas-run Islamic social services in Gaza. This dissatisfaction 
eventually boiled over in 2000 into a second uprising, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which was set apart 
from the first Intifada by both its increased violence–including numerous suicide bomb attacks–
and by the more prominent role of Hamas.  
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Many of the young men who had participated in the first Intifada as children and 
teenagers also participated in the second. According to Laetitia Bucaille, many shebab became 
particularly disenchanted with the new Palestinian Authority, which ushered in the reassertion of 
the modes of class and generational authority that had been up-ended and challenged by the 
prominence and importance of the shebab during the Intifada years. Traditional elites positioned 
their families for leadership roles in the new PA, and older and more established members of 
nationalist organizations assumed prominent positions, while the shebab were relocated to 
relatively low positions, if they found positions in the PA at all. Additionally, the PA took active 
steps to suppress protests by the shebab, who they saw as a potential threat to the political and 
social stability of the new regime, and the economic stability of the urban bourgeoisie, which 
was eager to return to business once the Intifada ended.132 According to Bucaille, these tensions 
and frustrations are at the heart of the increased violence and ferocity of the shebab during the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada, as men who thought themselves central to the formation of an independent 
Palestinian government sought to recapture and reclaim their relevance in a system that 
marginalized them after its founding. As one of her informants told her, “I spent fifteen years of 
my life behind bars, and here I am now,” working a lowly job with no sense of satisfaction or the 
material rewards deserved for a lifetime of sacrifice.133 
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